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1 Introduction 
Almost all international environmental agreements (IEAs) require a minimum number of 
countries to ratify the agreement before it enters into force. If the minimum membership 
condition is met, as well as other accompanying conditions, the treaty becomes active and 
ratifying countries are bound to their commitments. If the condition is not met, the treaty 
never enters into force and affected countries are not bound by its provisions. Minimum mem- 
bership requirements are standard in treaties that address global environmental issues, and 
Barrett (2003, pp. 165–194) provides a thorough examination of membership requirements 
in international environmental agreements. For example, the Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change required ratification by at least 55 parties 
prior to its entry into force in February 2005. Similarly, the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer required at least 11 countries to ratify it before it entered into 
force in 1989.1 Minimum membership requirements extend to treaties that address interna- 
tional risk and security, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
which required the ratification of the five nuclear nations (at that time) plus 40 additional 
nations. The Chemical Weapons Convention required ratification by at least 65 nations before 
it entered into force in 1997. While many treaties require ratification by a subset of affected 
parties to enter into force, some require all parties to join. For example, the Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic required accession of 
all contracting parties, and the Treaty of Lisbon required ratification by all European Union 
member states. 
Because of their wide-spread use in international agreements, there is a small game- 
theoretic literature on the role of minimum membership requirements. Black et al. (1992) 
find that an exogenously imposed minimum membership requirement can increase participa- 
tion with an international environmental agreement. A similar finding is discussed in Carraro 
and Siniscalco (1992). Clearly, however, national sovereignty requires that all provisions of 
international treaties, including membership requirements, be determined endogenously by 
affected parties. Carraro et al. (2009) provide an analysis of endogenous minimum partici- 
pation requirements in IEAs, and find that the mechanism increases the size of cooperative 
coalitions relative to the non-cooperative baseline. Particularly relevant for our study, Car- 
raro et al. also find that endogenous minimum participation requirements can lead to efficient 
outcomes. 2 
However, empirical data on the effectiveness of minimum participation constraints in IEAs 
is absent because of the lack of counterfactuals and controls necessary for careful analysis. 
Consequently, we use laboratory experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of endogenously 
determined minimum requirements in motivating coalition formation to provide public goods. 
Of course, laboratory experiments, like the game-theoretic models they stem from, dramat- 
ically simplify the international negotiation process. However, the experimental approach 
allows us to examine the performance of particular institutions in a controlled environment. 
Since international environmental agreements are designed to address collective action prob- 
1 Both the Kyoto and Montreal protocols included an extra provision to ensure participants represented a 
minimum level of global emissions. Members to the Kyoto Protocol had to represent at least 55 % of the total 
1990 greenhouse gas emissions. Similarly, the Montreal Protocol required representation of at least two-thirds 
of the total 1986 consumption of ozone-depleting substances. 
2 A recent working paper by Weikard et al. (2009) extends the theoretical analysis by Carraro et al. (2009) to 
include heterogeneous agents under different sharing rules. Harstad (2006) models coalitions of heterogeneous 
agents that contribute to a public good and derives optimal participation rules as well as solving for political 
equilibria (i.e., Condorcet winners). 
lems between resource users, the same fundamental tensions that exist between countries can 
be simulated in a laboratory environment, and the results of experiments can shed light on 
how institutional rules, in this case minimum participation rules, affect coalition formation.3
We begin by developing a theoretical model of endogenous agreement formation to pro- 
vide a public good, including the endogenous determination of a minimum membership 
requirement. Our model is a simplified version of the one in Carraro et al., yielding clearer 
predictions so that it is amenable to tests with experimental data. The game we analyze 
consists of two stages. The first stage is unique in the experimental coalition formation liter- 
ature in that individuals vote on a minimum membership requirement. In the second stage, 
each individual decides whether they will join a coalition to provide the public good and a 
coalition forms if the membership requirement is met. We demonstrate that expected-payoff- 
maximizing individuals will choose to adopt the minimum membership requirement that is 
equal to the efficient coalition size, and that this coalition will form. This theoretical result 
is robust to whether the efficient agreement is the grand coalition or a smaller coalition. 
We designed our laboratory experiments to test these predictions. Results show that when 
efficiency requires all players to join an agreement, subjects adopted the efficient minimum 
membership requirement about 75 % of the time. Conditional on subjects adopting the effi- 
cient minimum membership requirement, efficient agreements formed over 90 % of the time. 
Consequently, in these cases we observe significantly higher efficiency than other coalition 
formation experiments that do not include endogenous minimum membership requirements 
(e.g., Kosfeld et al. 2009; Dannenberg et al. 2010; McEvoy et al. 2011). The results were not 
as positive when efficiency required only 50 % participation. While subjects still adopted the 
efficient minimum membership requirement about 75 % of the time, the efficient coalition 
formed just over half of the time. Interestingly, the efficient coalition was blocked in about 
one-third of the cases in which it was adopted as the membership condition. While this is 
inconsistent with a theoretical model of individuals with standard preferences, we demon- 
strate that this behavior is consistent with a theory that allows for preferences concerning 
inequality in the manner of Fehr and Schmidt (1999).4 The lesson for international environ- 
mental policy making is clear: endogenous minimum participation requirements are effective 
at achieving high levels of cooperation, but they may be significantly less effective when the 
participation requirements allow for freeriders. 
Although no experimental research has investigated the effectiveness of minimum mem- 
bership requirements directly, a significant literature has done so indirectly with analyses of 
minimum contributing sets in public good games (e.g., Rapoport 1985; Erev and Rapoport 
1990; Cadsby and Maynes 1999; Cooper and Stockman 2002; McEvoy 2010). In these 
games, all individual contributions to the public good are returned if there are too few con- 
tributors. In contrast with our game, minimum contributing sets are not determined by the 
players themselves. A related literature on endogenous institution formation in public goods 
games has received much attention recently. Most of this literature explores the formation 
of institutions that govern all players (e.g., Walker et al. 2000; Gurerk et al. 2006; Tyran and 
Feld 2006; Kroll et al. 2007; Sutter et al. 2010). Typically, however, international treaties are 
formed to restrict the behavior of only participating nations. A handful of recent studies that 
are motivated by international treaty formation examine coalition formation in public goods 
3 The use of laboratory experiments in the evaluation of public policies is well established (Plott 1987; Shogren 
and Hurley 1999; Cason and Plott 1996; Stranlund et al. 2011), and experiments are particularly well suited 
to evaluate the effectiveness of different voluntary institutions. 
4 Others have conjectured that preferences over inequality might play important roles in international coop- 
eration because all treaties must tackle issues of equity (Ringius et al. 2002; Lange and Vogt 2003). 
games (e.g., Kosfeld et al. 2009; Dannenberg et al. 2010; McEvoy et al. 2011; Barrett and 
Dannenberg 2012), but none consider endogenous minimum membership requirements.5 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop our 
theoretical model and derive its predictions. In Sect. 3 we describe the experimental design 
we use to test these predictions. We present the results of the experiments in Sect. 4 and 
conclude in Sect. 5. 
2 Theory 
Consider a game in which n players decide whether to contribute a single unit to a public 
good. Our model is a variant of the seminal model by Barrett (1994). Let the number of 
individuals who contribute to the public good (and the total supply of the public good) be s. 
Let b > 0 denote the shared benefit players receive from contributions to the public good up 
to s̄  ≤ n and let c > 0 denote the individual cost of contributing. The basic payoff function 
of a player that contributes to the public good is 
πi = A + bs − c for s ≤ s̄ , (1) 
where A is a positive constant. Assume that c > b so that no player would contribute to 
the public good in a standard, non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. However, suppose that 
collective welfare is maximized when s̄  individuals contribute their units to the public good. 
In the typical coalition formation game, collective welfare is maximized when everyone 
contributes; that is, when s̄  = n. However, we also allow for the possibility that it is efficient 
that the public good be provided by a coalition that is smaller than the grand coalition. We 
assume a simple case of this in which individual contributions yield a return of b up to an 
aggregate level and additional contributions yield a return of zero. For example, abatement 
activities that move emissions levels below the absorptive capacity of the natural environment 
will not yield additional environmental benefits. Examples of this also include any project 
for which contributions in excess of what is required to provide the good do not yield public 
benefits. In either case, if s̄  is efficient, then n( A + bs̄ ) − cs̄  > n A, which requires nb > c. 
Given the motivation for collective action to provide the public good, suppose that the 
players are able to form a cooperative coalition in a two-stage game. In the first stage (the 
voting stage), all players vote on the minimum number of members required for a coalition 
to form. Players cannot vote for a membership requirement equal to zero and they cannot 
opt out of this vote. We call the outcome of this vote the minimum membership requirement. 
In our experiments we implement a plurality voting rule so that the number that receives the 
most votes becomes the membership requirement.6 
5 The sequence of decisions in some of the coalition formation experiments differs significantly from the 
sequence of decisions in international treaty formation. For example, in the experiments of Kosfeld et al. 
(2009), players first decide whether to join a coalition, and then the members vote on whether to contribute to 
the public good. Hence, in their analysis members of a coalition decide what the coalition should accomplish 
after they make their participation decision. In contrast, the players in our study understand ex ante what they 
are required to do in a coalition before they make their decision to join or not. This corresponds more closely 
to the actual process of treaty formation, where countries typically decide the commitments of the coalition 
members and what triggers entry into force before they decide whether to ratify (join). 
6 A plurality voting rule is often implemented in local and national elections to determine a single winner 
when there are more than two candidates. See Myerson and Weber (1993) for an analysis of voting equilibria 
under plurality voting rules. 
In stage two of the coalition formation game (the coalition stage), the players decide 
independently and sequentially whether or not to join the coalition.7 The order in which the 
players make their join/not join decisions is unknown in the voting stage of the game, and 
each potential order is equally likely. This order is revealed to the players in the coalition 
stage. Decisions to join or not join are observed by all other players in the second stage.8 
If enough players join so that the membership requirement is met, the coalition forms and 
its members provide their units of the public good. Throughout we call such a coalition an 
effective coalition. Those that do not join an effective coalition do not provide their units of the 
public good (because c > b), but still benefit from its provision. If the minimum membership 
requirement is not met, an effective coalition does not form and no player contributes to the 
public good. 
We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium for this game, consisting of individual votes 
for the minimum membership requirement in the first stage of the game and decisions to join 
or not join a coalition in the second stage. An equilibrium is found by backward induction, so 
we start by describing the coalition stage. At this point in the game a minimum membership 
requirement has been chosen. Denote the membership requirement as sp . Using (1), those 
who decide to join a coalition with s members earn: 
A + bs − c for s ≤ s̄  if   s ≥ sp ; 
πm(s) = A + bs̄  − c for s > s̄  if   s ≥ sp ; 
A if  s < sp. 
(2) 
Throughout the superscript m indicates the player is a member of a coalition. Nonmembers, 
identified by the superscript nm, earn: 
A + bs for s ≤ s̄  if   s ≥ sp ; 
πnm(s) = A + bs̄  for s > s̄  if   s ≥ sp ; (3) 
A if s < sp. 
From (2) and (3) it is clear that when an effective coalition forms, nonmembers earn strictly 
higher profits than members, because they enjoy the benefits of public good contributions 
without incurring the cost of contributing. However, if the minimum membership requirement 
is not met, both members and nonmembers earn their noncooperative payoff A. 
Players will join an effective coalition only if it is profitable for them to do so in the sense 
that they earn at least as much in the coalition as they would if no coalition formed. Thus, a 
coalition is profitable for its members if and only if πm(s|s ≥ sp) = A +bs −c ≥ A. Assume
throughout that a coalition with s̄  members is strictly profitable so that πm(s̄ |s̄  ≥ sp) > A,
or rather, bs̄  − c > 0. Note from (2) that π s|s ≥ sp is increasing in s up to s̄  and then 
is constant. Combined with b < c, these relations imply that there exist coalition sizes that 
are strictly greater than one and weakly less than s̄  that are profitable. The smallest of these 
profitable coalitions is: 
smin = min s|π
m(s|s ≥ sp) = A = min {s|s ≥ c/b} , (4) 
7 Although our game is motivated by the model of Carraro et al. (2009), it is not a special case of their model.
This is primarily due to the facts that they require unanimity in the vote for the membership requirement and 
players make their decision to join an agreement simultaneously. 
8 In fact, having the players decide to join or not in sequence and with perfect information about these decisions 
is a reasonable description of the actual process of treaty accessions. Differences in the lengths of national 
debates about the decision to ratify a treaty and differing positions of a treaty on national legislative agendas 
imply that ratification decisions must be sequential. Moreover, the decision to ratify a treaty or not tends to be 
very public. 
where smin ∈ (1, s̄ ]. For an effective coalition to form in the second stage of the game both 
the membership requirement and the profitability requirement must be satisfied. 
The players make their decisions to join or not join sequentially. Define a critical player 
as one whose choice to not join a coalition prevents the coalition from forming. That is, a 
player is critical if and only if n − sp players have already opted out of the coalition. Suppose 
at first that the membership requirement is sp ≥ smin. A critical player in this situation will 
always choose to join a coalition of sp members. To see why, note first that if a critical player 
refuses to join a coalition then no coalition will form and the player will earn A. However, the 
player earns a higher payoff if he is part of a profitable coalition. So, if a critical player joins 
a coalition then he either earns this higher payoff if all the other critical players also join, or 
he earns the payoff A if one of the other critical players refuses to join and a coalition does 
not form. Therefore, when sp ≥ smin a critical player will always join a coalition because he 
cannot be worse off by doing so and he may be strictly better off. Since all critical players will 
join a coalition, a noncritical player would never join, because it is always more profitable 
to stay out of a profitable coalition. Therefore, given sp ≥ smin, the outcome of the second 
stage coalition game is that an effective coalition of sp individuals will form. Moreover, 
since nonmembers earn strictly higher payoffs than members, the first n − sp players in the 
sequence will decide to not join the coalition and the last sp players will decide to join. In 
the second stage of the game, all members of the coalition make their contributions to the 
public good, while the remaining players contribute nothing. 
Now suppose that the membership requirement is sp < smin. In this case, a critical player 
will choose to not join because he would be joining an unprofitable coalition. Since no critical 
player will join a coalition if sp < smin, the outcome of the second stage coalition game in 
this case is that an effective coalition will not form and all players contribute nothing to the 
public good. 
To sum up, the equilibrium of the second stage coalition formation game is a coalition size 
and provision of the public good s∗ such that s∗ = sp if sp ≥ smin and s∗ = 0 if sp < smin.
In the first case the first n − s∗ players to decide whether or not to join the coalition choose
not to, while the last s∗ players join the coalition.9 
Now let us examine the determination of the minimum membership requirement sp in 
the voting (first) stage of the game. Following Carraro et al. (2009), we assume that players 
vote sincerely in the sense that they vote for the membership requirement that gives them the 
highest expected payoff from the perspective of the first stage of the game.10 
From our description of the coalition stage of the game, if the membership requirement is 
not less than the minimum profitable coalition, a player’s payoff is determined by his position 
in the order in which the players make their decisions whether to join a coalition. Recall that 
this sequence is unknown in the first stage of the game. Hence, a player that expects an 
effective coalition of s players to form in the second stage evaluates the probability that he 
will be a member of this coalition as s/n and the probability that he will not be a member as 
(n − s)/n. His expected payoff from the perspective of the first stage of the game is then: 
9 Others have examined sequential decision making in threshold public good games. Erev and Rapoport
(1990) and Cooper and Stockman (2002) derive similar equilibria to ours in threshold public good games in 
which players are assigned the order in which they must decide whether to contribute to a public good. In their 
studies a threshold is specified exogenously, which is referred to as the minimum contributing set. We noted 
the similarity between minimum contributing sets and minimum membership requirements for international 
treaties in the introduction. McEvoy (2010) explores the endogenous order of sequential decisions in public 
good games and finds that the timing of participation decisions is sensitive to the threshold in these games. In 
particular, he finds that subjects are more likely to rush to opt out of voluntary coalitions when the free-riding 
payoff is larger. 
10 Palfrey (1984) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) also analyze games given sincere voting. 
v(s) = (s/n) πm(s) + ((n − s)/n) πnm(s). (5) 
Remove the sp constraint from (2) and (3), substitute the results into (5), and differentiate 
with respect to s to obtain: 
vt(s) = 
b − c/n > 0, for s ≤ s̄ ; 
−c/n < 0, for s > s̄ . 
(6) 
Equation (6) indicates that the expected payoff of every player is maximized at the efficient 
coalition size. Given that all players vote sincerely in the first stage of the game, each of them 
votes to implement the efficient coalition as the minimum membership requirement. That is, 
sp = s̄ . 
Moving ahead to the coalition formation stage, since the efficient coalition size is prof- 
itable, sp = s̄  ≥ smin. Therefore, the coalition s∗ = s̄  will form. Obviously, if s̄  = n, then
all players will join the coalition. If s̄  < n, then the first n − s̄  players to make their join/not 
join decision will choose to not join, while the last s̄  players join the coalition.11 The main 
prediction of the theory is that the endogenous determination of a minimum membership 
requirement allows players to form an efficient coalition to provide a public good. In the next 
section we present our experimental design used to test this prediction under two scenarios; 
one in which efficiency requires full participation (i.e., the grand coalition) and one in which 
efficiency requires only partial participation. 
3 Experiments 
Following the theoretical model, our experiments have two stages, a voting stage and a 
coalition formation stage. The context of the experiment is fairly generic; subjects decide 
whether to join a coalition (called an agreement) with its members making a discrete choice 
to contribute to the public good (called a public account). We implement two experimental 
treatments that differ according to the returns to individual contributions to the public good. 
In one treatment the marginal return to contributions is constant so that the efficient coalition 
is the grand coalition. In the other treatment, the marginal return to public good contributions 
is constant up to an aggregate level and then zero so that the efficient coalition is smaller than 
the grand coalition. 
We chose parameter values of n = 6, A = 10, and c = 10 for each treatment. In 
one treatment the marginal return to all individual contributions was set at b = 4.5. Since 
nb − c > 0 for all contributions, the efficient coalition in this case is six individuals (s̄  = 6). 
In the other treatment, b = 4.5 for contributions up to three units and then zero after three 
units. The efficient coalition size in this case is three individuals (s̄  = 3). Plugging our 
parameter values into Eq. (4) reveals a minimum profitable coalition size of three members. 
Therefore, in both treatments, coalitions of three or more are profitable for the members. 
All sessions were run at the experimental economics laboratory at Appalachian State 
University using software specifically designed for this experiment.12 Subjects were recruited 
from the undergraduate and graduate student populations. Two sessions were implemented 
for each of the treatments. In each session, three groups of six subjects were in the lab. 
11 Carraro et al. (2009) provide sufficient conditions for their game to result in the formation of the grand 
coalition. Our game satisfies those sufficient conditions. Carraro et al. do not examine the case in which the 
efficient coalition is smaller than the grand coalition. 
12 The experiment instructions can be found at: http://davemcevoy.weebly.com/uploads/2/2/7/0/2270780/
instructions_ere2014.pdf. 
 
These groups of six were reshuffled each period throughout the experiment, which lasted 20 
periods.13 For each treatment we have 720 individual-level observations, which include their 
votes for the membership requirement in the first stage and their decisions to join a coalition 
in the second stage. We also have 120 group-level observations on coalition formation, public 
good provision and overall group efficiency. The sessions lasted for roughly 1 h, subjects were 
paid their cumulative earnings and earned $16.50 on average (20 experimental dollars = $1). 
In the first stage of the experiments, subjects simultaneously voted on the minimum mem- 
bership requirement for a coalition to form in the second stage. The membership requirement 
that received the most votes was implemented in the second stage of the game. Ties were 
settled by a random draw. 
In the coalition formation stage, each subject decided whether or not to join the coalition. 
Following the theoretical model, these decisions were made sequentially under perfect infor- 
mation. Each of the six subjects in a group was randomly assigned an order in which to make 
decisions, and this order changed each period.14 For example, if a subject was assigned an 
order number of three, then she had to wait for the first two players to submit their choices 
before she could make her decision. Once a subject made their choice they could not change 
it. During this stage, all subjects were informed about whether the subjects before them 
joined the agreement or did not join the agreement. They were also constantly reminded of 
the membership requirement for the agreement to form. Therefore, each player knew with 
certainty whether their participation decision was critical for the coalition to form. 
If enough players joined the coalition to satisfy the minimum membership requirement, 
then the coalition ‘formed’ and those that joined contributed to the public good. Those who did 
not join did not contribute. If too few subjects joined the coalition to satisfy the membership 
requirement, then no coalition formed and no one contributed to the public good. 
4 Results 
Our experimental data suggest the following broad conclusions. The majority of subjects in 
both treatments voted for efficient minimum membership requirements. These votes led to 
the adoption of the efficient membership requirements in roughly three out of every four 
trials for both treatments. When efficiency required full participation (the s̄  = 6 treat- 
ment), coalitions formed in 85 % of all trials. The efficient coalition almost always formed 
(91.3 %) when the efficient membership requirement was adopted. Overall, efficiency was 
very high in this treatment, about 87.4 % as measured by the ratio of realized group earnings 
to maximum group earnings. Hence, group results in the s̄  = 6 treatment closely matched 
our theoretical predictions that groups will use the membership requirement to form effi- 
cient coalitions. However, performance was significantly worse in the treatment for which 
a 3-player coalition was efficient (the s̄  = 3 treatment). In this treatment coalitions formed 
in only 61 % of all trials and the efficient coalition formed in only about half the trials. 
Consequently, average efficiency was significantly lower in these treatments (about 80 %) 
than in the s̄  = 6 treatments. Interestingly, the efficient coalition was blocked about a third 
of the time when the efficient membership requirement was adopted. This behavior is not 
13 To mitigate reputation effects, we follow the literature with subject anonymity and a stranger design. Though
imperfect, the stranger design ensured no group was repeated, which was known by subjects. Anonymity 
conditions did not allow subjects to track other subjects or their decisions. With similar anonymity conditions, 
Fehr and Gächter (2000) find behavior is equivalent across imperfect and perfect stranger designs. 
14 Subjects were not aware of their decision order when voting on the minimum membership requirement in 
the first stage. 
Table 1  Individual votes and referenda outcomes by minimum membership requirement and treatment 
Minimum membership requirement 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Totals 
s̄  = 6 35 (4.9 %) 27 (3.8 %) 53 (7.4 %) 66 (9.2 %) 139 (19.3) 400 (55.6 %) 720 
2 (1.7 %) 3 (2.5 %) 6 (5.0 %) 7 (5.8 %) 10 (8.3 %) 92 (76.7 %) 120 
s̄  = 3 91 (12.6 %) 153 (21.2 %) 409 (56.8 %) 32 (4.4 %) 9 (1.3 %) 26 (3.6 %) 720 
7 (5.8 %) 19 (15.8 %) 92 (76.7 %) 1 (0.8 %) 0 (0.0 %) 1 (0.8 %) 120 
Top of each cell Number of votes for each minimum membership requirement (percent of total votes by 
treatment). Note there are 720 individual votes per treatment. Bottom of each cell Number of times each 
minimum membership requirement was implemented (percent of total trials by treatment). Note there are 120 
group-level observations per treatment 
Fig. 1  Percentage of votes for efficient coalitions by treatment 
consistent with a theory of coalition formation that includes only individuals with standard 
payoff-maximizing preferences. However, we will demonstrate that this behavior is consis- 
tent with a theory that allows for preferences over inequality. 
We begin our detailed analysis of the results by examining the data on voting for the 
membership requirement in the first stage of the experiments. Table 1 provides votes and 
referenda outcomes by membership requirement and treatment. The first row in each cell 
contains the number of votes and percentage of total votes (out of 720 for each treatment) for 
that minimum membership requirement. The second row in each cell contains the number 
of times and percentage of trails in the treatment (out of 120) that membership requirement 
was implemented. 
Under the s̄  = 6 treatments, the 6-player membership requirement received 55.6 % (400 of 
720) of total votes, which is considerably more than the 19.3 % received by the second most 
preferred option of a 5-player membership requirement. The remaining four options received 
even fewer votes. This voting behavior resulted in the selection of the efficient membership 
requirement in 76.7 % (92 of 120) of referenda. 
The percentage of votes for efficient membership requirements is very similar across the 
two treatments. In the s̄  = 3 treatment, the 3-player membership requirement received 56.8 % 
of the votes. Membership requirements of size two received the second most with 21.2 % 
of votes. Mirroring the results from the s̄  = 6 treatment, voting led to the adoption of the 
Table 2  Regression results comparing the two treatments 
Vote on 
efficient 
MMR 
Efficient 
referenda 
outcomes 
Total coalition 
formation 
Efficient 
coalition 
formation 
Efficiency 
s̄  = 3 0.029 0.006 −0.264 −0.268 −0.069 
0.817 0.922 0.000 0.003 0.015 
Model 131.69 24.83 44.27 22.97 3.20 
0.000 0.073 0.001 0.115 0.000 
Period effects 109.54 18.57 20.56 5.89 2.58 
(Chi-square) 0.000 0.182 0.2468 0.970 0.001 
Subject effects 665.64 – – – – 
(Chi-square) 0.000 
n 1440 240 240 184 240 
Notes: The first four columns report average marginal effects (and p values) for the s̄  = 3 treatment (relative 
to the s̄  = 6 treatment) from Probit regressions. The first model controls for period fixed effects and subject 
random effects. The other three Probit regressions are at the group-level and control for period fixed effects. 
The last model is a linear regression with a dependent variable defined as total group earnings/max group 
earnings and controls for period fixed effects 
efficient membership requirement in 76.7 % (92 of 120) of referenda. Figure 1 illustrates the 
percentage of votes for efficient membership requirements over periods for both treatments. 
To summarize, the majority of subjects in both treatments voted for efficient membership 
requirements, and these were adopted in roughly three out of every four trials. 
Figure 1 suggests that the time series of the percentages of votes for the efficient coalition 
are very similar between the two treatments. We confirm this with results from a Probit 
model conditioning individual voting decisions on treatment, period fixed effects and subject- 
specific random effects. These results are reported in the first column of Table 2. Note that 
the treatment effect (s̄  = 3) is insignificant. In addition, the Probit model in the second 
column of Table 2 confirms that the likelihood of groups adopting the efficient membership 
requirement is statistically equivalent in the two treatments. 
Recall that our theoretical model yields the prediction that expected-payoff-maximizing 
players would vote for minimum membership requirements equal to efficient coalition sizes. 
Our experimental results from the voting stage are broadly consistent with this prediction in 
that the majority of subjects voted to adopt the efficient membership requirements. However, 
in contrast with our theoretical model we do observe significant, though minority, voting 
for smaller-than-efficient membership requirements. Our theoretical model is not helpful in 
explaining why 45 % of votes were cast for inefficient agreement sizes. It is interesting to 
note that in each treatment the second most frequent vote was for one member less than the 
efficient agreement size. These votes are consistent with players attempting to increase their 
chances to free ride on profitable agreements. For example, a lone free rider on a coalition 
of five players in the full participation treatment would be the highest possible earner. Of 
course there are other possible explanations for this behavior. If players are not confident that 
other group members will join the agreement when it is rational to do so (if for example, they 
have a trembling hand when making their participation decision), then a lower participation 
threshold may appear less risky.15 
15 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this possible explanation. See McGinty (2011) for an
example of trembling hand equilibria in a coalition formation game. 
Table 3  Coalition formation by minimum membership requirement and treatment 
Minimum membership requirement 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
s̄  = 6 1 1 5 4 7 84 102 
0.8 % 0.8 % 4.2 % 3.3 % 5.8 % 70.0 % 85.0 % 
50.0 % 33.3 % 83.3 % 57.1 % 70.0 % 91.3 % 
s̄  = 3 1 9 62 0 0 1 73 
0.8 % 7.5 % 51.7 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.8 % 60.8 % 
16.7 47.7 % 67.4 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 100.0 % 
Top of each cell Number of times coalitions formed. Middle of each cell Percentage coalition formation by 
number of trials per treatment. Bottom of each cell Percentage coalition formation by adopted membership 
requirement 
While the results from the voting stage are equivalent in the two treatments, the results 
from the coalition formation stage differ significantly. Table 3 contains results concerning 
coalition formation by minimum membership requirement and treatment. For each member- 
ship requirement/treatment combination we provide the number of times a coalition formed 
under the membership requirement, this number as a percentage of total trials, and coalition 
formations as a percentage of times the membership requirement was adopted. The final 
column in Table 3 contains the number and percentage of trials a coalition of any size formed 
(i.e., all effective coalitions). 
Under the s̄  = 6 treatment, coalitions of any size formed in 102 of 120 trials (85 %). In 
84 of 120 trials the efficient coalition formed (70 %). Moreover, when players adopted the 
efficient membership requirement of six players, coalitions almost always formed (84 of 92, 
91.3 %). Thus, coalitions formed quite frequently in the s̄  = 6 treatments and most coalitions 
were efficient. Other coalition sizes formed much less frequently. This suggests that the main 
reason why coalitions did not form in a subset of trials is because groups sometimes failed to 
implement the 6-player membership requirement. In both treatments, if a coalition failed to 
form then no player contributed to the public good and each earned 10 experimental dollars. 
In contrast, coalitions formed significantly less frequently under the s̄  = 3 treatment. 
Overall, coalitions formed in 60.8 % of trials in this treatment, which is significantly lower 
than the 85 % coalition formation rate under the s̄  = 6 treatment. This is confirmed by the 
results of the third model in Table 2, which is a Probit model of total coalition formation. 
Note that the dummy for the s̄  = 3 treatment is negative and significant. Furthermore, the 
efficient coalition formed in 51.7 % of trials (62 of 120), compared with 70 % of trials in the 
s̄  = 6 treatment. The most striking difference between the two treatments is the percentage of 
coalitions that formed conditional on the adoption of an efficient membership requirement. 
In both treatments, the referenda resulted in efficient membership requirements in 92 of 120 
trials. With the s̄  = 6 treatment, coalitions formed in 84 of those 92 trials (91.3 %). However, 
under the s̄  = 3 treatment, coalitions formed in 62 of those 92 trials (67.4 %). The fourth 
Probit model in Table 2 confirms that the likelihood of a coalition forming when the efficient 
membership requirement was adopted is significantly lower in the s̄  = 3 treatment. 
Let us explore this phenomenon more closely, since it implies that some individuals will- 
fully blocked efficient coalitions in the sense that they were critical for the formation of 
the coalition but refused to join so the coalition failed to form. The 3-player membership 
requirement was implemented in 92 out of 120 trials (76.7 % from Table 1) under the s̄  = 3 
Table 4  Public good provision 
and efficiency 
Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Each treatment 
consists of 120 group-level 
observations 
treatment. The efficient coalition failed to form in 30 of these trials. These blocks are inconsis- 
tent with a model that contains only individuals with standard expected-payoff-maximizing 
preferences. Such individuals would never block a profitable coalition, and efficient coali- 
tions are always profitable. However, these blocks are consistent with the presence of subjects 
who are averse to disadvantageous inequality. When s̄  = 3, the efficient outcome requires 
that the three non-members earn strictly higher payoffs than the three members. If players 
dislike payoff inequality, it is possible that coalitions that are profitable in terms of material 
payoffs are no longer profitable in terms of utility. In fact, minimum profitable coalition sizes 
for inequality-averse players will be weakly greater than those for players with standard 
preferences. Therefore, inequality-averse players may block efficient coalitions that are not 
individually profitable given their inequality preferences. That inequality averse individuals 
require higher minimum profitable coalition sizes is demonstrated theoretically in Kosfeld 
et al. (2009) for a game that is similar to ours. We demonstrate this result for our model in 
the Appendix. 
We complete our data analysis with results on average public good provision and average 
efficiency in Table 4. Efficiency for each group in each period is calculated as the ratio of 
aggregate payoffs to maximum attainable payoffs. As expected, public good provision and 
efficiency were lower in the s̄  = 3 treatment than in the s̄  = 6 treatment. The significance 
of the difference in efficiency levels is confirmed in the linear regression results contained in 
the final column of Table 2. 
To judge the performance of the endogenous determination of minimum membership 
requirements, we can compare the efficiency level of our s̄  = 6 treatment (87.4 %) to recent 
experimental coalition formation studies that do not include this feature. The efficiency level 
in this treatment is quite high relative to these other studies.16 For example, Kosfeld et al. 
(2009) conducted two coalition formation treatments which differed in the minimum number 
of members required for coalitions to be profitable (either 3 or 2 out of 4). As noted earlier, 
subjects in their experiments first decided whether to join a coalition, and then in a second 
stage the coalition members voted whether to contribute all of their endowment to the public 
good or not. Efficiency levels in their experiments were 51 and 70 % for minimum profitable 
coalition sizes of 3 and 2, respectively. 
Among a number of treatments in McEvoy et al. (2011) were two coalition formation 
treatments that differed in terms of the individual costs of providing the good, producing 
different sizes of minimally profitable coalitions. These were then set as minimum member- 
ship requirements. One treatment required 3 of 10 subjects to join before a coalition formed 
while the other had a membership requirement of 6 of 10 subjects. The authors did not allow 
contributions from nonmembers and did not allow contributions if a coalition did not form; 
hence their efficiency measures are fairly conservative. Efficiency levels were 59.6 % for the 
3-player membership requirement and 56.2 % for the 6-player membership requirement. 
16 We cannot use the literature to judge the performance of our treatment, because all other coalition formation
experiments require the formation of the grand coalition for efficient provision of a public good. 
Treatment Average public good provision Efficiency 
s̄  = 6 4.75 87.4 % 
(0.26) (2.21) 
s̄  = 3 1.78 79.6 % 
(0.31) (2.07) 
Subjects performed much worse in the experiments of Dannenberg et al. (2010). They 
conducted three coalition formation treatments with 10-player groups. The authors report an 
efficiency level of 24 % for one treatment in which coalition members’ contribution decisions 
were determined automatically by maximizing joint welfare. In another treatment coalition 
members only contributed half of what was required to maximize joint welfare and efficiency 
fell to 12 %. The efficiency level was 29 % in a third treatment in which coalition members 
endogenously determined the required minimum contribution. Although there are significant 
differences in the protocols between the experiments in Dannenberg et al. (2010) and our 
own (including group sizes), the comparison suggests that endogenous thresholds serve as 
effective coordination devices in coalition formation games. 
5 Conclusion 
Many international environmental agreements include a minimum membership requirement 
for entry into force. Despite the wide-spread use of these requirements, little is known about 
their effectiveness. We have analyzed a coalition formation game that includes the endoge- 
nous determination of a minimum membership requirement and then tested the theoretical 
predictions of the game using a series of laboratory experiments. The main prediction of our 
theoretical model is that agents will vote to adopt efficient coalition sizes as membership 
requirements and that these coalitions will form. Our experimental results are largely con- 
sistent with the theoretical predictions when efficiency requires the grand coalition to form. 
In this treatment, coalitions formed 85 % of the time and over 90 % of these were the effi- 
cient grand coalition. These results demonstrate the value of the endogenously determined 
membership requirements. In fact, the level of efficiency for this treatment is significantly 
higher than in other coalition formation experiments that do not include the endogenous 
determination of membership requirements. 
However, in our treatment for which the efficient coalition required only a subset of the 
group, coalitions formed only 60 % of the time and efficient coalitions were deliberately 
blocked about a third of the time. If these blocks had not occurred, performance in this treat- 
ment would have matched the performance of the treatment that required the grand coalition 
to form for efficient provision of the public good. Although individuals with standard prefer- 
ences would never block efficient coalitions from forming, these actions are consistent with 
inequality-averse individuals. Equity concerns may help explain the choice of membership 
requirements in many existing voluntary institutions; in particular, the fact that many inter- 
national agreements require very high levels of participation (Barrett 2003). In light of our 
results it is possible that equity concerns can limit the formation of international agreements 
when membership requirements would allow free riders. One might expect that inefficiently 
high membership requirements would emerge to limit freeriding, although we do not observe 
this in our experiments. The role of equity preferences in the formation of voluntary agree- 
ments is not well understood, so further research in this area would be beneficial. Another 
caveat is that our analysis assumes homogeneity in the costs and benefits of providing a 
public good. Future research should relax this simplifying assumption and explore the role 
of endogenous minimum participation requirements among heterogeneous players. 
Our objective was to empirically test a feature of international governance—endogenous 
minimum participation—that is included in almost all environmental treaties. Although our 
laboratory experiments necessarily abstract from the many intricacies involved with inter- 
national management of shared resources, the results shed light on the effectiveness of the 
institution in a controlled environment. The take away message for stakeholders in interna- 
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tional diplomacy is that endogenous minimum participation requirements can be effective 
at fostering cooperation, but may be significantly less effective when targeted participation 
allows for free riding. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Here we incorporate inequality aversion into our model to demonstrate that minimum prof- 
itable coalitions are weakly larger for inequality averse individuals than for individuals with 
standard preferences. We follow Fehr and Schmidt (1999) in modeling preferences over 
inequality. Suppose at first that s̄  = n and sp = 0. Given the financial payoffs (2) and (3) 
with these restrictions, define the utility of a member of an effective coalition with s members 
as: 
um m 
αi m βi m 
i (s) = πi  (s) − n 1
  
j 
I=i 
max πj − πi  (s), 0 − n 1
  
j 
I=i 
max πi  (s) − πj , 0 , (7) 
where αi > 0 captures the player’s loss from disadvantageous inequality and βi > 0 captures 
her loss from advantageous inequality. Since πnm(s) − πm(s) = c and πm(s) − πm(s) = 0 
from (2) and (3), (7) can be written as: 
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i  (s) = A + bs − c − 
n 1 
. (8) 
Similarly, the utility of a nonmember of an effective coalition with s members is: 
unm nm 
αi nm 
i   (s) = πi    (s) − n 1
  
j 
I=i 
max πj − πi    (s), 0
βi 
max πnm(s) − π , 0 , (9) 
− 
n − 1 
which can be written as 
i 
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. (10) 
− 1 
It is straightforward to show that the free-riding incentive is preserved in this model if 
(n − 1)(βi − 1) < αi ; that is, as long as the aversion to advantageous inequality is not 
too strong relative to the aversion to disadvantageous inequality. Incorporating the efficient 
coalition size s̄  ≤ n to determine individual payoffs yields: 
A + bs − c − αi (n −s )c 
i (s) = 
A + bs̄  − c − 
n−1 for s ≤ s̄ ;  αi (n −s )c 
n−1 
¯; 
(11) 
unm A bs 
βi sc 
n−1 
for s ≤ s̄ ; 
i   (s) = A bs 
βi sc (12) 
+  ¯ − n−1 for s > s̄ . 
Using (11), an individual’s minimum profitable coalition size can be characterized as: 
= ŝ i if ŝ i ≤ s̄    c (n − 1 ) + αi cn 
 
i 
− 
− 
To demonstrate s̃ i , we first derive ŝ i as the solution to: 
 αi (n − s )c 
A + bs − c − 
n 1 
= A. (14) 
Since um(s) in (11) is increasing in s, if ŝ i  ≤ s̄  then ŝ i is i ’s minimum profitable coalition
size. However, if ŝ i > s̄ , then s̃ i must be the solution to 
 αi (n − s )c 
A + bs̄  − c − 
n 1 
= A. (15) 
Plug ŝ i into (14) and s̃ i into (15), set the resulting equations equal to each other and collect 
terms to obtain b(ŝ i − s̄ ) = αi c(s̃ i − ŝ i )/(n − 1), which implies that s̃ i > ŝ i if ŝ i > s̄ . 
Recall from (4) that the minimum profitable coalition size for an individual with standard 
preferences is smin = min{s|s ≥ c/b}. From (13), s̃ i ≥ ŝ i , ŝ i is increasing in αi , and ŝ i = c/b 
for αi = 0. Together, these imply s̃ i ≥ smin for an individual with disadvantageous inequality 
aversion (i.e., αi > 0). Therefore, such an individual has a weakly higher minimum profitable 
coalition size than an individual with standard preferences. 
By substituting in our experimental parameters into equation (13) we can demonstrate 
how large αi must be to increase the minimum profitable coalition size beyond the efficient 
size. In the treatment with an efficient coalition of three members, if αi exceeds 0.584, then 
the minimum profitable coalition for an individual will exceed three members. As a frame 
of reference, at least 40 % of players in Fehr and Schmidt’s analysis were estimated to have 
α > 0.50. 
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